

QUANTUM OBLIVIOUS LWE SAMPLING AND INSECURITY OF STANDARD MODEL LATTICE-BASED SNARKS

NOVEL LATTICE ASSUMPTIONS '26

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THE LEARNING WITH ERRORS PROBLEM

A mod- q linear system “with errors” to solve

LWE(m, n, q, σ): Learning With Errors

- Input: $(A, As + e)$ where,

$$A \xleftarrow{\text{unif}} (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^{m \times n}, \quad s \xleftarrow{\text{unif}} (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^n \quad \text{and} \quad e \leftarrow \mathcal{D} \quad \text{s.t. } |e_i| \approx \sigma$$

- Output: s

→ Distribution $\mathcal{D}$ ensures small coefficients for e

Parameters m, n, q, σ are chosen to ensure **unicity of the solution s**

$(s, e) \mapsto As + e \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^m$ is **sparse** in its range

*Variants of the LWE-hardness have been introduced
to design some advanced cryptographic primitives*

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Assumption: Efficient Oblivious LWE-Sampling is Impossible

Every algorithm generating LWE samples $(A, b \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} As + e)$
knows the underlying secret s

- Assumption used [GMNO18, NYI⁺20, ISW21, SSEK22, CKKK23, GNSV23] to ensure security of lattice SNARKs (Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge)

BUT WHY?

- It seems hard: sample $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^{m \times n}$ won't give $\mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e}$ with $\mathbf{e}$ short (sparse in its range)
- Useful for security reductions
 - (i) suppose access to a decryption oracle
 - (ii) any adversary asking decryption of a well formed encryption $\mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e}$ won't learn more that it already knows (to form the encryption it necessarily knows $\mathbf{s}$)

An Oblivious Sampler for LWE:

A **quantum algorithm** generating LWE samples $(A, b \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} As + e)$ without knowing s

→ The only way to extract s from the sampler is to solve the LWE-problem $(A, As + e)$

- ▶ Our quantum oblivious sampler takes advantage of:
 - **complex phases** in quantum computation
 - an optimal **unambiguous quantum measurement**
- ▶ First application: it invalidates security proofs of some lattice-based SNARK but does not break them

1. Basics on Quantum Computing
2. A Fundamental Quantum State to Build
3. How to Build this Quantum State
4. Quantum Oblivious LWE Sampler

BASICS ON QUANTUM COMPUTING

CLASSICAL BITS VERSUS QUANTUM BITS

Classical bits	Quantum bits
$(\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^n$ $(b_1, \dots, b_n) \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^n$	$(\mathcal{H}, \ \cdot\ _2)$ Hilbert space $\sum_{(b_1, \dots, b_n) \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^n} \lambda_{(b_1, \dots, b_n)} b_1, \dots, b_n\rangle \in \mathcal{H}$ where $\sum_{(b_1, \dots, b_n)} \lambda_{(b_1, \dots, b_n)} ^2 = 1$ and the $ b_1, \dots, b_n\rangle \in \mathcal{H}$ being orthonormal

For us the result of a computation will always be integers mod q ...

Could we extract integers mod q from quantum states?

Measurement in the computational basis:

$$\sum_{(b_1, \dots, b_n)} \lambda_{(b_1, \dots, b_n)} |b_1, \dots, b_n\rangle \xrightarrow{\text{measure}} (b_1, \dots, b_n) \text{ with probability } |\lambda_{(b_1, \dots, b_n)}|^2$$

- If you know classically how to sample $\mathbf{x}$ according to $|f|^2$, then you can build

$$\sum_{\mathbf{x}} f(\mathbf{x}) |\mathbf{x}\rangle$$

- If you know classically to compute $\mathbf{x} \mapsto g(\mathbf{x})$, then you can perform the operation

$$\sum_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}} \lambda_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}} |\mathbf{x}\rangle |\mathbf{y}\rangle \longrightarrow \sum_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}} \lambda_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}} |\mathbf{x}\rangle |\mathbf{y} + g(\mathbf{x})\rangle$$

A FUNDAMENTAL TOOL: QUANTUM FOURIER TRANSFORM

One of the most useful tool in quantum computing: **QFT**

Classical and Quantum Fourier transforms over $(\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^n$

Classical Fourier Transform	Quantum Fourier Transform: QFT
$f = (f(\mathbf{x}))_{\mathbf{x} \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^n}$ $\widehat{f}(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{q^n}} \sum_{\mathbf{y} \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^n} f(\mathbf{y}) e^{2i\pi \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle / q}$	$ \psi_f\rangle = \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^n} f(\mathbf{x}) \mathbf{x}\rangle \quad (\ f\ _2 = 1)$ QFT $ \psi\rangle \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \widehat{\psi_f}\rangle = \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^n} \widehat{f}(\mathbf{x}) \mathbf{x}\rangle$

→ In particular: $\forall \mathbf{x} \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^n$, $\text{QFT} |\mathbf{x}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{q^n}} \sum_{\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n} e^{2i\pi \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle / q} |\mathbf{y}\rangle$

$|\mathbf{x}\rangle \mapsto \text{QFT} |\mathbf{x}\rangle$ is quantum efficiently computable

A FUNDAMENTAL QUANTUM STATE

Key Idea:

To achieve oblivious LWE sampling,

(i) build $\sum_{s,e} \left(\prod_i \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(\sigma)(e_i)} \right) |As + e\rangle$ and (ii) measure

$$\left(\text{Gauss}(\sigma)(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{e^{-\pi x^2 / \sigma^2}}{\sigma} \right)$$

Is it hard to build $\sum_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}} \left(\prod_i \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(\sigma)(e_i)} \right) |\mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e}\rangle$?

A FUNDAMENTAL QUANTUM STATE TO BUILD

Is it hard to build $\sum_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}} \left(\prod_i \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(\sigma)(e_i)} \right) |\mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e}\rangle$?

Yes!

→ Building $\sum_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}} \left(\prod_i \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(\sigma)(e_i)} \right) |\mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e}\rangle$ implies the ability to compute a short vector in a lattice **which is a hard problem...**

Quantum Regev Reduction in a Nutshell:

- (i) $\sum_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}} \left(\prod_i \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(\sigma)(e_i)} \right) |\mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e}\rangle \xrightarrow{\text{QFT}} \sum_{\mathbf{x}: \mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{A} = 0} \left(\prod_i \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(4/\sigma)(x_i)} \right) |\mathbf{x}\rangle$
- (ii) Then measuring gives a short $\mathbf{x}_0$ in the lattice $\{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{A} = \mathbf{0} \bmod q\}$

Fundamental Remark: Adding Phases

Considering $\sum_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}} \lambda_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}} \left(\prod_i \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(\sigma)(e_i)} \right) |\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}\rangle$ where $\lambda_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}} \in \mathbb{C}$ and $|\lambda_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}}| = 1$

- ▶ Measuring with phases still gives a quantum oblivious LWE sampler
- ▶ Measuring after applying QFT does not necessarily give a short lattice vector

$$\text{QFT} \left(\sum_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}} \lambda_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}} \left(\prod_i \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(\sigma)(e_i)} \right) |\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}\rangle \right) \neq \sum_{\mathbf{x}: \mathbf{x}^T \mathbf{A} = 0} \prod_i \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(4/\sigma)(x_i)} |\mathbf{x}\rangle$$

HOW TO BUILD THE FUNDAMENTAL QUANTUM STATE

Naive Approach to Build $\sum_{s,e} \left(\prod_i f(e_i) \right) |As + e\rangle$:

- Build,

$$\sum_{s,e} \left(\prod_i f(e_i) \right) |s\rangle |e\rangle \quad (f \text{ is efficiently computable})$$

- Multiplication by A and add to the second register,

$$\sum_{s,e} \left(\prod_i f(e_i) \right) |s\rangle |As + e\rangle$$

- Disentangle **by applying an LWE-solver**, i.e., $\mathcal{A}(As + e) \mapsto s$,

$$\sum_{s,e} \left(\prod_i f(e_i) \right) |s - \mathcal{A}(As + e)\rangle |As + e\rangle = \sum_{s,e} \left(\prod_i f(e_i) \right) |0\rangle |As + e\rangle$$

→ **Not efficient**: it relies on an LWE-solver

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- $\sum_{s,e} \left(\prod_i \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(\sigma)(e_i)} \right) |As + e\rangle \xrightarrow{\text{QFT}} \sum_{x: x^T A=0} \left(\prod_i \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(4/\sigma)(x_i)} \right) |x\rangle$

[CLZ22]⁽¹⁾ proposed **a new approach** to build

$$\sum_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}} \left(\prod_i f(e_i) \right) |\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}\rangle$$

→ **Unambiguous measurement** to disentangle $\sum_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}} \left(\prod_i f(e_i) \right) |\mathbf{s}\rangle |\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}\rangle$

⁽¹⁾Yilei Chen, Qipeng Liu, and Mark Zhandry. *Quantum algorithms for variants of average-case lattice problems via filtering*. In EUROCRYPT, 2022.

A Game From Quantum Information Theory:

- **Input:** a random quantum state $|\psi_i\rangle$ from a set of known state $\{|\psi_1\rangle, \dots, |\psi_N\rangle\}$
- **Output:** i , i.e., which state has been chosen

- ▶ If the $|\psi\rangle_i$'s are orthogonal: we can perfectly distinguish them: it corresponds to a classical source (distinguishing sequences of bits)
- ▶ If the $|\psi\rangle_i$'s are not orthogonal: we **cannot perfectly** distinguish them. However we can unambiguously distinguish them


$$|\psi_i\rangle \xrightarrow{\text{measure}} \begin{cases} i : \text{success} \\ \perp : \text{failure} \end{cases}$$

PREVIOUS WORK: [CLZ22] AND UNAMBIGUOUS MEASUREMENT

Given $\mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{a}_1 \mid \cdots \mid \mathbf{a}_m)^\top$ and denoting $\mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{y} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_i x_i y_i \in \mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$

$$\sum_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}} \left(\prod_i f(e_i) \right) |\mathbf{s}\rangle |\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}\rangle = \sum_{\mathbf{s}} |\mathbf{s}\rangle \bigotimes_i \underbrace{\left(\sum_{e_i} f(e_i) |\mathbf{a}_i \cdot \mathbf{s} + e_i\rangle \right)}_{\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} |\psi_{\mathbf{a}_i \cdot \mathbf{s}}\rangle}$$

$$\forall j \in \mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}, \quad |\psi_j\rangle \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{e \in \mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}} f(e) |j + e\rangle$$



Key-Idea: Quantum Unambiguous Measure

$$|\psi_{\mathbf{a}_i \cdot \mathbf{s}}\rangle \xrightarrow[\text{measure}]{\text{unambiguous}} \begin{cases} \mathbf{a}_i \cdot \mathbf{s} & \text{with probability } p \\ \perp & \text{with probability } 1 - p \end{cases}$$

Using a quantum unambiguous measure reduces to solve a linear system **with erasure**

QUANTUM OBLIVIOUS LWE SAMPLER

$$\sum_{\mathbf{s}} |\mathbf{s}\rangle \left(\sum_{e_1} f(e_1) |\mathbf{a}_1 \cdot \mathbf{s} + e_1\rangle \right) \otimes \cdots \otimes \left(\sum_{e_m} f(e_m) |\mathbf{a}_m \cdot \mathbf{s} + e_m\rangle \right)$$

$\downarrow$
 $\perp$

$\downarrow$
 $\mathbf{a}_m \cdot \mathbf{s}$

We succeed to recover $\mathbf{a}_i \cdot \mathbf{s}$ **with probability p**

We are successful on $\approx pm$ coordinates: it is necessary that **$pm \geq n$** to recover $\mathbf{s} \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^n$

► In [CLZ22]: $p^{\text{CLZ}} = \frac{\min_x |\widehat{f}(x)|^2}{q}$

► **Optimal unambiguous measurement** [CB98]⁽²⁾: $p^{\text{CB}} = q \cdot \min_x |\widehat{f}(x)|^2$

⁽²⁾Anthony Chefles and Stephen M. Barnett. *Optimum unambiguous discrimination between linearly independent symmetric states*. Phys. Lett. A, 1998.

Our quantum algorithm **uses m registers** with $m = \frac{n}{p^{\text{CB}}} = \frac{n}{q \cdot \min_x |\hat{f}(x)|^2}$

Issue:

If $f = \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(q, \sigma)}$, then $\hat{f} = \text{Gauss}(2/\sigma)$

$$m = \frac{n}{q \cdot \min_x |\hat{f}(x)|^2} = e^{\Omega(n)}$$

Key-Idea: Use Phases

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(\sigma)(x)} & \text{if } x > 0 \\ (-1) \cdot \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(\sigma)(x)} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Then,

$$m = \frac{n}{q \cdot \min_x |\hat{f}(x)|^2} \leq \frac{n}{\text{Gauss}(\sigma)(0)} \approx n \cdot \sigma$$

(with measurement from [CLZ22]: $m = q^2 \cdot n \cdot \sigma = e^{\Omega(n)}$ when $q = e^{\Omega(n)}$)

Theorem:

Parameters m, n, q, σ are functions of λ and they satisfy,

$$q \text{ prime, } m, \log q \leq \text{poly}(\lambda), \quad m \geq n\sigma \cdot \omega(\log \lambda) \quad \text{and} \quad 2 \leq \sigma \leq \frac{q}{\sqrt{8m \ln q}}.$$

Then, there exists a $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ -time quantum oblivious $\text{LWE}(m, n, q, \sigma)$ instance sampler, under the assumption that $\text{LWE}(m, n, q, \sigma)$ is hard.

→ To reach other parametrizations (σ larger, q not prime, etc. . .)

we use reductions (modulus switching, noise flooding) conserving obliviousness

The following sampler has been proposed by an anonymous reviewer at QIP '25

1. Generate

$$\sum_{\mathbf{x}} \left(\prod_i \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(4/\sigma)(x_i)} \right) |\mathbf{x}\rangle |\mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{A}\rangle$$

2. Measure the second register: we observe $\mathbf{x}_0^\top \mathbf{A}$ and the quantum state collapses to:

$$\sum_{\mathbf{x}: \mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{A} = 0} \left(\prod_i \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(4/\sigma)(x_i)} \right) |\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{x}_0\rangle |\mathbf{x}_0^\top \mathbf{A}\rangle$$

3. Applying the **QFT** leads to (same computation as Regev's reduction + translation becomes phase after Fourier):

$$\sum_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}} \omega_q^{\mathbf{x}_0 \cdot (\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e})} \left(\prod_i \sqrt{\text{Gauss}(\sigma)(e_i)} \right) |\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}\rangle |\mathbf{x}_0^\top \mathbf{A}\rangle$$

Our result: a quantum algorithm which **obliviously** samples (given $\mathbf{A}$),

$$\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \text{ with } \mathbf{s} \xleftarrow{\text{unif}} (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^n \text{ and } \mathbf{e} \leftarrow \text{Gauss}(\sigma)^{\otimes m}$$

What we did not discuss:

- Definition of classical and quantum oblivious sampling
- How to efficiently run the unambiguous measurement from [CB98]
- Why does it invalidate the security proofs of some SNARKs

Future Work:

Is this oblivious LWE-sampler can be used to design advanced quantum protocols?



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Optimum unambiguous discrimination between linearly independent symmetric states.

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